Rational Adversaries? Evidence from Randomized

Trials in the Game of Cricket by Bhaskar, V
Rational Adversaries? Evidence from Randomized
Trials in the Game of Cricket
V. Bhaskar∗
Dept. of Economics
University of Essex
Wivenhoe Park
Colchester CO4 3SQ, UK.
Email:vbhas@essex.ac.uk
March 8, 2004
Abstract
In cricket, the right to make an important strategic decision is assigned via a
coin toss. We utilize these “randomized trials” to examine (a) the consistency
of choices made by teams with strictly opposed preferences, and (b) the treat-
ment eﬀects of chosen actions. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of inconsistency,
with teams often agreeing on who is to bat ﬁrst. Estimated treatment eﬀects
show that choices are often poorly made since they reduce the probability of
the team winning.
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1 Introduction
While the assumption of rational behavior underlies most economic theory, this is
being questioned by the recent rise of behavioral economics. Since Kahneman and
Tversky’s pioneering work, many experiments demonstrate that subjects have a va-
riety of biases when they deal with uncertainty. Experimental subjects also do not
perform well when playing simple games — O’Neill’s (1987) experiments on games
with a unique completely mixed equilibrium are a case in point. The interpretation
of these results is however debatable. Subjects in experiments are placed in an unfa-
miliar and somewhat artiﬁcial situation, and usually have insuﬃcient opportunities
to learn how to choose optimally. Their incentives to do so may also be limited.
Professional sports provide several instances of alternative real life experiments,
which are not subject to some of these criticisms. Professional players spend their
prime years learning how to play optimally, and are repeatedly involved in familiar
situations. They also have high-powered incentives. The rules of the game are clear
cut, as in experiments, even though they have not been designed with academic
economists in mind. An emerging literature has exploited this data source. Walker
and Wooders (2001) study the serve behavior of professional tennis players, and ﬁnd
that behavior corresponds closely to the mixed strategy equilibrium of the associated
game. Similar support for the mixed equilibrium is found in the case of penalty kicks
in soccer (Chiappori et. al. (2002) and Palacios Huertas (2003)). These results
contrast rather sharply with the negative experimental results on games with a
unique mixed equilibrium. Given the incentive eﬀects and the opportunities to
learn, violations of optimality in professional sports also need to be taken seriously
by economists. Thus Romer (2003) uses dynamic programming to analyze strategy
in American football, and ﬁnds that decisions are not made optimally.1
This paper investigates the rationality of strategic decisions in the game of
cricket. Cricket is a game played between two teams, one of which must bat ﬁrst,
while the other team ﬁelds. The roles of the teams are then reversed. The decision,
as to whether a team bats ﬁrst or ﬁelds ﬁrst, is randomly assigned to one of the two
teams, via the toss of a coin. From a decision theoretic point of view, this strate-
gic decision combines several important qualities. First, batting or ﬁelding is not
1Relatedly, Duggan and Levitt (2002) examine collusion in sumo wrestling, while Ehrenberg
and Bognano (1990) have studied the incentive eﬀects of golf tournaments. Garciano et. al. (2001)
use data from soccer to examine social pressures on refereeing decisions. There is also substantial
earlier literature examining the industry of sport or its labor market.
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assigned by the coin toss, but must be chosen by the winner. Second, this choice
is recognized by cricket players to be an important decision, since the conditions
for batting or ﬁelding can vary over time, with variation in the weather and condi-
tion of the natural surface on which the game is played. Third, the optimal choice
is non trivial, since it is not constant, but depends upon natural conditions — in
the matches we consider, the team winning the toss has chosen to bat on roughly
half the occasions. Finally, from an economist’s standpoint, the right to decide is
assigned via a coin toss thereby providing a randomized trial par excellence, and
allowing us to test for the rationality of choices.
Our tests of rationality are of two types, internal consistency and external va-
lidity. The intuition underlying our empirical test of consistency in decision making
is straightforward. We start from the presumption that all the multifarious consid-
erations that inﬂuence the decision, including the nature of the pitch, the strengths
of the respective teams and the weather (i.e. the state of the world), are only of
relevance through their eﬀect on two probability distributions — the probability dis-
tribution over the outcomes of the game when team 1 bats ﬁrst, and the probability
distribution over outcomes when team 2 bats ﬁrst. If team 1 wins the toss, it will
choose to bat if it prefers the former probability distribution to the latter probability
distribution. If this is so and if the interests of the teams are perfectly opposed, this
implies that team 2 will prefer the latter probability distribution to the former, and
must choose to bat ﬁrst if it wins the toss.2 Thus at any state of the world, 1 chooses
to bat ﬁrst if and only if 2 chooses to bat ﬁrst. Of course in any match, we only
observe one of these decisions, since only one of the teams wins the toss. However,
since identity of the winner of the toss is a random variable which is independent
of the state of the world, this allows us to aggregate across any subset of the set of
possible states, to make the following probabilistic statement: the probability that
team 1 bats ﬁrst given that it wins the toss must equal the probability that it ﬁelds
ﬁrst given that its opponent wins the toss. Thus our test of rationality is a test of
the consistency of the decisions made by a team and its opponents. This is akin
to tests of revealed preference theory — while revealed preference theory tests the
consistency of a single decision maker who is assumed to have stable preferences
over time, we test the consistency of decisions of pairs of agents whose interests are
perfectly opposed. Our basic ﬁnding is that is that the consistency of decisions is vi-
2This assumes that teams have symmetric information regarding the state of the world. Section
4 discusses the modiﬁcations that must be made in the case of asymmetric information.
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olated for an important class of cricket matches — one day internationals which are
played in the day-time — since some teams systematically choose diﬀerently from
their opponents. We explore diﬀerent explanations for this lack of consistency, in-
cluding asymmetric information, but conclude that the best explanation is in terms
of teams overweighting their own strengths (and weaknesses) and underweighting
the strengths of their opponents in making decisions.
These randomized trials also allow us to infer the external validity of decisions
since we can infer the eﬀects of the choices upon the outcome of the game. Choices
are endogenous, and their eﬀects also heterogenous, since this depends upon the
state of the world. Nevertheless, since the right to choose is assigned via a coin
toss, we show that if decisions are made optimally, one can infer the average eﬀect
of a treatment (such as batting ﬁrst), conditional on the treatment being optimal.
Consider a state of the world ω where batting ﬁrst is optimal, and where team
1 garners an advantage λ(ω) > 0 from choosing to bat, where λ is the diﬀerence
between win probabilities from team 1 batting ﬁrst and ﬁelding ﬁrst. Then at
this state of the world, its opponent team 2 has an identical advantage λ(ω) from
batting ﬁrst. Thus one has a randomized trial where the winner of the toss is
assigned to the treatment group and its “twin”, the team losing the toss, is assigned
to the control group. Our substantive ﬁndings are intriguing since there is strong
evidence that teams are making decisions sub-optimally in one day international
day matches, since the eﬀect of choosing to bat ﬁrst is estimated to reduce the
probability of winning. We therefore ﬁnd violation of both internal consistency and
external validity for the main class of international one day matches, those played in
the day time. For day-night matches, which are partially played at night-time, both
consistency and external validity are not rejected, possibly because teams have a
strong preference for batting ﬁrst in daylight, which the data suggests is empirically
sound.
The layout of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out our
model of the basic strategic decision, and derives its empirical implications. Section
3 reports the empirical results. Section 4 explores various explanations for anoma-
lous results such as asymmetric information and agency problems The ﬁnal section
concludes.
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2 Modelling Decisions
At the highest level the game of cricket is played between representative national
teams. There are two forms of the game at this level, test matches and one day
internationals. In a one day match, each team bats once, with a maximum period
for its innings (unless it is bowled out), the winner being the team that scores more
runs while batting. With essentially only two outcomes, win or loss, risk preferences
are irrelevant, implying an immediate zero sum property on preferences so long as
each team prefers to win. This makes one day matches ideal for our analysis.3 The
sequence in which the teams bat is decided via the toss of a coin. The captain
of the team that wins the toss has to choose whether to bat ﬁrst or to ﬁeld ﬁrst.
This decision is acknowledged to be of strategic importance by cricket players and
observers, since the advantage oﬀered to the bowlers varies with the weather, and
the condition of the pitch, the natural surface on which play takes place. Unlike
baseball, the ball usually strikes the pitch before it reaches the batsman, and may
bounce or deviate to diﬀerent degrees depending upon the pitch. The ability to
exploit the pitch and conditions also depends upon the type of bowler. Fast bowlers
beneﬁt when there is moisture in the pitch, early in the match, since this increases
the speed and bounce oﬀ the pitch. Fast bowlers also like overcast conditions.
On the other hand, bowlers who spin the ball are more eﬀective later in a game,
after the pitch has been worn out through play. The pitch may also deteriorate,
so that it becomes rather diﬃcult to bat towards the end of a match. Playing
conditions are also rather diﬀerent between matches which are played entirely in
the day (which we call day matches), and matches which are played partially at
night (day-night matches). In day-night matches, the team batting second bats at
night under ﬂoodlights, and may be at a disadvantage.
The team that bats second has the advantage of knowing the rate at which it
must score in order to win the game. The team batting ﬁrst sets the score, and
faces the risk that if attempts an ambitious target, it may be bowled out for a low
score. On the assumption that the batting team can choose the scoring rate (at the
cost of losing the wickets of its batters stochastically more quickly), Clark (1988)
and Preston and Thomas (2000) use a dynamic programming analysis to show that
the team batting second has a signiﬁcant advantage.
We set out the following simple model of decision making in the game of cricket.
3In test matches, a draw occurs a signiﬁcant fraction of the time, so that players’ risk preferences
are relevant. A companion paper (Bhaskar, 2004) analyzes decisions in test matches.
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Fig. 1: Advantage From Batting First
Let the two teams be 1 and 2, and let us describe the outcome from the standpoint
of team 1. Consider the decision of the team, as to whether bat ﬁrst or to ﬁeld
ﬁrst. This decision is made by the captain who wins the toss, and many factors will
inﬂuence this decision. To model this, let ω denote the state of the world — this
includes a complete speciﬁcation of all the circumstances which aﬀect the outcome
of the cricket match, including the quality and type of bowlers in each side, the
quality of the batsmen, the weather, the state of the pitch, etc. Let Ω denote the
set of all possible states of the world. Thus ω determines a pair (p(ω), q(ω)), where
p(ω) denotes the probability that team 1 wins given that it bats ﬁrst, and q(ω)
denotes the probability of a win when it ﬁelds ﬁrst. We shall assume symmetric
information, i.e. that the state ω is observed by team 1 and by team 2 before they
make their decision. Let λ(ω) = p(ω)− q(ω).
Figure 1 graphs λ as a function of ω, where Ω is depicted as a compact interval,
with states arranged in order of decreasing λ. It is immediate that team 1 will
choose to bat ﬁrst at states ω where λ(ω) > 0. Similarly, team 1 will choose to ﬁeld
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ﬁrst if λ(ω) < 0. Finally, we assume that the set of states ω such that λ(ω) = 0 is
negligible, i.e. this set has zero prior probability.
Turning to team 2, it will choose to bat ﬁrst if its probability of winning is higher
than when ﬁelding, i.e. if 1− q(ω) > 1− p(ω), i.e. if λ(ω) > 0. We deduce that the
set of states where 1 bats ﬁrst is the same as the set of states where 2 bats ﬁrst, so
that the two teams can never agree on who is to bat ﬁrst, a no agreement result.
Let ΩB(resp. ΩF ) denote the set of states where batting ﬁrst (resp. ﬁelding ﬁrst) is
optimal.
At any state, we only observe the decision of one of the two players. However,
the right to take this decision is via a coin toss, which is independent of the state of
the world. To an outside observer, the probability that team 1 bats ﬁrst equals the
probability that ω ∈ ΩB, Pr(ΩB). Similarly, the probability that team 2 bats ﬁrst
also equals the Pr(ΩB). Thus if we consider any two teams, the observed decisions
of team 1 when it wins the toss are realizations of a Bernoulli random variable
with success probability Pr(ΩB). Similarly, under no agreement, the decisions of
team 2 are also realizations of the same Bernoulli random variable. Under the null
hypothesis induced by the no agreement result, the proportion of times that 1 bats
ﬁrst on winning the toss is equal to the proportion of times that 2 bats ﬁrst on
winning the toss. Our basic tests of this null hypothesis are based on the Pearson
test statistic which is distributed as χ2 variable with one degree of freedom.
Two points are worth making here. First, the speciﬁcation of the state of the
world can be very general, and can encompass a range of factors. Thus, we may
ﬁx the identity of team 1 (say to be a speciﬁc country, e.g. Australia). We may
however allow the identity of team 2 to vary, so that we consider Australia’s games
against all its opponents, since the identity of the opponent may be encapsulated in
the state of the world ω. The null hypothesis may thus be reformulated as follows:
the probability that team 1 bats ﬁrst when it wins the toss equals the probability
that it ﬁelds ﬁrst when it loses the toss. Second, it is easily veriﬁed that the null
hypothesis also holds for any identiﬁable subset Ω′ of Ω, since we may rephrase the
above statements in terms of conditional probabilities. Thus the probability that
team 1 bats ﬁrst when it wins the toss given that ω ∈ Ω′ must equal the probability
that it ﬁelds ﬁrst when ω ∈ Ω′.4
The no agreement result relies on the fact that the teams have strictly opposed
4Aggregation does not cause us to wrongly reject the null, though it may reduce the power of
test.
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von-Neumann Morgenstern preferences over the set of outcomes. Such an opposition
of preferences is immediate when the game has only two possible outcomes, win
and loss, and where each team prefers to win. However, the match can also have
“no result” when bad weather curtails play, so that the number of overs bowled is
below the stipulated minimum. Since the outcome “no result” largely depends upon
exogenous factors such as the weather, its probability is unlikely to be aﬀected by
who bats ﬁrst, and our analysis can be straightforwardly extended to allow for this.
A match can also be tied when the scores of the two teams are exactly equal — this
occurs with probability less than 0.01, which suggests that the marginal eﬀect of the
batting/ﬁelding choice upon this probability is minuscule. Thus the no-agreement
result appears to be well founded.
The no-agreement result is straightforward, and follows from the Harsanyi doc-
trine, that diﬀerences in beliefs must reﬂect diﬀerences in information. However, it
does not seem straightforward to professional cricketers, who often suggest that a
team might choose in line with its strengths. Thus they ﬁnd it entirely reasonable
that a team with a strong batting line up could choose to bat ﬁrst, while its op-
ponent with good fast bowlers might choose to ﬁeld ﬁrst.5 This suggests a natural
alternative hypothesis: that teams overweight their own strengths when making a
decision, while underweighting the strengths of their opponents. Consider for exam-
ple a situation where team 1 has a strong fast bowling attack, while team 2 does not
have such a strong attack of fast bowlers, but has good batsmen. Thus team 1 may
choose to ﬁeld ﬁrst since it feels that its bowlers may be able to exploit the condi-
tions early in the match. On the other hand, team 2 may prefer to bat ﬁrst, since
it has less conﬁdence in its fast bowlers. If teams did have asymmetric strengths,
and if they overweight their own strengths, then the null hypothesis would be sys-
tematically violated — in this example, team 1 would bat ﬁrst less frequently than
team 2 did.6
Our tests of the no-agreement result can be viewed of tests of the consistency of
5In his famous book, The Art of Captaincy, former England captain Mike Brearley (1985)
devotes a chapter to the choice made at the toss, and recounts several incidents where both
captains seem to agree. This includes one instance where the captains agreed to forgo the toss,
since they agreed on who was to bat ﬁrst, and another instance where there was some confusion
on who had won the toss, but this was resolved since the captains agreed on who should bat ﬁrst.
6Even if teams’ behavior is in line with the alternative (overweighting) hypothesis, the null will
not be rejected as long as teams have symmetric strengths. Also, since the strengths of various
teams change over time, the alternative suggests that one should condition on ﬁner partitions of Ω
while testing of the null. Note however that the null hypothesis is valid at any level of aggregation
or disaggregation.
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the decisions made by the captains of the two teams. As such, these tests are similar
to tests of single agent decision theory (e.g. tests based on individual consumption
data or experiments), the novelty here being that we are able to use the decisions
made by diﬀerent agents.
We now turn to the eﬀects of the choices made upon the outcome of the game.
Let us start by asking, what is the advantage conferred by batting ﬁrst, on winning
the toss? We may of course compute the proportion of wins by the team that wins
the toss and bats ﬁrst. However, the decision to bat ﬁrst is clearly endogenous (unlike
the winning of the toss). This maybe related to the treatment eﬀects literature, as
in Heckman et. al. (1999). Let batting ﬁrst be the treatment. Clearly, batting
ﬁrst is optimal only for a subset of states, ΩB. Thus our interest is the average
eﬀect of the treatment when the treatment is optimal, i.e. upon E(λ(ω) |ΩB). This
is more interesting than the unconditional expectation of λ, which is the average
treatment eﬀect (although this can also be estimated). A medical analogy maybe
useful here. Think of two procedures, surgical and non-surgical, which maybe chosen
by a doctor. One is interested in the eﬀect of surgery upon some outcome when
surgery is optimal, not the average eﬀect of surgery, including states where surgery
is clearly suboptimal. The diﬃculty in the medical analogy is that for any patient
who is treated, one does not have a corresponding control. However, in the cricket
context, whenever ΩB occurs, the team that wins the toss is assigned the treatment
(under our assumption of rational decision making), while the team that loses the
toss is assigned to the control group. Furthermore, this assignment of teams (to the
treatment or control groups) is random and independent of team characteristics,
since it is made via the coin toss. Indeed, it is striking that at any state ω ∈ ΩB,
the winner of the toss is assigned to the treatment group, and has advantage λ(ω)
from this assignment, whereas the loser of the toss who is assigned to the control
group has an identical disadvantage from this assignment. Thus the diﬀerence in
performance between the teams that win the toss and bat ﬁrst and those that lose
the toss and ﬁeld ﬁrst, provides an unbiased estimate of the treatment eﬀect when
the treatment is optimal. More formally, we may write, the probability that a team
wins conditional on it winning the toss and batting is given by:
Pr[Win|(WT &Bat)) =
∫
ΩB
p(ω)f(ω)dω +
∫
ΩB
[1− q(ω)]f(ω)dω
2Pr(ΩB)
(1)
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This can be simpliﬁed to yield:
Pr[Win | (WT & Bat)) = 0.5[1 +E(λ(ω) |ΩB)] > 0.5. (2)
Similarly, we can compute the advantage from ﬁelding ﬁrst given that ﬁelding is
optimal.
Pr[Win | (WT & Field)) = 0.5[1− E(λ(ω) |ΩF )] > 0.5. (3)
We are now in a position to analyze the advantage from winning the toss upon out-
comes in a one-day game. This is simply a weighted average of the mean advantage
from batting ﬁrst when batting is optimal, and the advantage from ﬁelding ﬁrst
when ﬁelding is optimal, as below:
Pr(Win |WT) = 0.5{Pr(ΩB)[1 +E(λ(ω) |ΩB)] + Pr(ΩF )[1− E(λ(ω) |ΩF )]} . (4)
This expression shows that Pr(Win |WT) > 0.5. This follows from the fact that
λ(ω) > 0 if ω ∈ ΩB, which implies E(λ(ω) |ΩB) > 0, and λ(ω) < 0 if ω ∈ ΩB,
which implies E(λ(ω) |ΩB) < 0. Thus we have the intuitive result that winning a
toss confers an advantage. Intuitively, the empirical proportion of wins by the team
winning the toss is an unbiased estimate of the advantage conferred by winning the
toss. Team 1 could be better than team 2, but each is equally likely to win the toss,
i.e. the probability of winning the toss is unrelated to the strength of the teams.
Thus the diﬀerence in win probabilities between the winners of the toss and losers
provides an unbiased estimate of the advantage conferred.
To summarize, our empirical tests will be of two kinds. First, we shall examine
the consistency of decisions made by the teams, i.e. the no-agreement result. Second,
we shall consider the optimality of these decisions in terms of outcomes. Given the
simplicity of our hypotheses, we will be able to rely mainly on non-parametric
tests of the two hypotheses. It is worth noting that these tests are, in a sense,
orthogonal to each other. That is, teams may be behaving consistently without
choosing optimally. Conversely, they may be inconsistent, but this inconsistency,
while clearly suboptimal, may have no discernible eﬀect on outcomes.
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3 Empirical Results
Our data include all one day international matches played between the nine major
international teams, since the inception of international one day games in 1970, till
July 2003. (In order to ensure competive balance, we have left out involving matches
involving the weaker teams). We make a distinction which are played entirely in
daylight (day matches) and day-night matches where the team batting second does
so at night under ﬂoodlights. In day-night matches teams have a strong preference
for batting ﬁrst in daylight, and the team winning the toss bats ﬁrst 70% of the
time, whereas in day matches this proportion is only 40%.
Table 1: Decisions at the Toss, Day Matches7
Pr(Bat |WT) Pr(Field |LT) # matches Pearson p value
Australia 0.51 0.47 319 0.54 0.46
England 0.34 0.36 277 0.10 0.75
India 0.36 0.35 383 0.09 0.77
New Zealand 0.43 0.41 307 0.16 0.69
Pakistan 0.48 0.35 414 7.96∗∗∗ 0.005
South Africa 0.60 0.52 162 1.13 0.29
Sri Lanka 0.24 0.36 280 5.05∗∗ 0.03
West Indies 0.28 0.44 362 9.72∗∗∗ 0.002
Zimbabwe 0.45 0.45 164 0.01 0.93
Table 1 presents our results for day matches. For each of the nine teams, we
consider all matches played against any of the other eight opponents. The ﬁrst
column shows the proportion of times that the team bats ﬁrst on winning the toss,
and the second column shows the proportion of time that the team ﬁelds ﬁrst on
losing the toss. The penultimate column show the value of the Pearson test statistic
for the equality of these two probabilities — this is distributed as a χ2 with one
degree of freedom. The ﬁnal column shows the probability of getting this value of
the test statistic under the null hypothesis. The table shows that for six of the
nine teams, the proportions in the ﬁrst two columns are close to each other, so that
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, for three of the nine teams (West
Indies, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, whom we shall henceforth refer to as the Gang of
Three or G3), the null hypothesis is rejected at 5% level. We ﬁnd that the West
7We systematically use the following abbreviations: WT – Win Toss, LT – Lose Toss. Signiﬁ-
cance levels: ∗ = 10%, ∗∗ = 5%, ∗∗∗ = 1%.
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Indies and Sri Lanka have a higher probability of ﬁelding ﬁrst as compared to their
opponents, whereas Pakistan has a higher probability of batting ﬁrst as compared to
its opponents. The fact that consistency is violated in matches involving a speciﬁc
team, say the West Indies, does not imply that the West Indies are making the
wrong decision. It does imply, prima facie, that either the West Indies or their
opponents are choosing incorrectly.
It is possible that the rejection results in table 1 for one team (say Pakistan) are
being driven by the rejection results of another team in the Gang of Three. To check
this in table 2 we consider each of the teams in G3 for whom the null is rejected,
but only considering games against the other six teams (i.e. we exclude entirely any
matches which between teams from the Gang of Three). We still ﬁnd that the null
hypothesis is rejected at 5% level for Sri Lanka and the West Indies and rejected at
10% level for Pakistan.
Table 2: Day Matches: Against Opponents not from Gang of Three
Pr(Bat |WT) Pr(Field |LT) # matches Pearson p value
Pakistan 0.51 0.38 260 4.23∗∗ 0.04
Sri Lanka 0.24 0.42 176 6.05∗∗ 0.014
West Indies 0.27 0.42 255 6.84∗∗∗ 0.009
To explore this further, we test whether the entire data is consistent with the
null. To do this, we consider all 1333 day matches, and let the dependent variable
be a dummy variable which equals one if and only if the team that wins the toss bats
ﬁrst. Our controls consist of 32 dummies, one for each pair of teams. In addition,
we include eight dummies, where dummy k takes value 1 if and only if team k wins
the toss. Under the null, the coeﬃcients on the eight dummies should be zero: an
F-test shows that the null is rejected at the 5% level, with a p−value of 0.02. This
is reported in table 4 (page 13). Thus for day matches, we ﬁnd a clear rejection of
the no agreement result.
Turning to day-night matches in table 3 (page 13), we ﬁnd that teams have a
much stronger preference to bat ﬁrst — indeed, every team bats ﬁrst on winning
the toss more frequently in day-night matches as compared to day matches. We also
ﬁnd that although there are some diﬀerences between the frequency of batting when
winning the toss and the frequency of ﬁelding on losing the toss, the Pearson tests
show that null hypothesis cannot be rejected at conventional levels of signiﬁcance for
any of the teams. On the one hand, it seems that teams agree that there is usually
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Table 3: Decisions at the Toss, Day-Night Matches
Pr(Bat |WT) Pr(Field |LT) # matches Pearson p value
Australia 0.78 0.68 211 2.50 0.11
England 0.79 0.79 96 0.0 0.98
India 0.65 0.68 130 0.13 0.72
New Zealand 0.64 0.59 119 0.46 0.50
Pakistan 0.77 0.83 124 0.58 0.45
South Africa 0.61 0.75 116 2.38 0.12
Sri Lanka 0.69 0.72 131 0.20 0.66
West Indies 0.65 0.72 100 0.55 0.46
Zimbabwe 0.83 0.63 45 2.18 0.14
a signiﬁcant advantage to batting ﬁrst in day-night matches. On the other hand,
the sample sizes are also much smaller (the mean number of day night matches per
team is 120 as compared to 274 day matches). Table 4 also shows that the null
cannot be rejected in the sample of day-night matches as a whole, by an F test.
However, when we combine all matches, day and day-night, the null is rejected,
since the dummy variables for the identity of the toss winner are jointly signiﬁcant.
Table 4: Joint Test of Irrelevance of Identity of Toss Winner
#matches F test statistic p value
Day Matches 1333 2.26 0.02
Day Matches, neutral venues 433 2.27 0.02
Day-Night Matches 538 0.80 0.61
All Matches 1871 2.11 0.03
To summarize, the results are mixed across diﬀerent classes of matches. In day-
night matches, where teams appear to agree on the advantage of batting ﬁrst in
daylight, no-agreement cannot be rejected. In day matches, the null is rejected,
with three teams — Pakistan, Sri Lanka and West Indies — choosing diﬀerently
from their opponents. Overall, the results show that the West Indies demonstrate
a clear tendency to ﬁeld ﬁrst, as compared to their opponents, in both classes of
matches. This is reinforced by the analysis of test matches (Bhaskar, 2004), where
the West Indies ﬁeld ﬁrst signiﬁcantly more often than their opponents. This is
noteworthy — for a large part of this sample, the West Indies were the strongest
team on the international stage. Their dominance was due in large part to a battery
of fast bowlers, who were renowned for their pace and hostility, and their ability
to intimidate opposing batsmen. Our result suggest that the West Indies favored
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ﬁelding ﬁrst as an aggressive tactic, based on their fast bowling strength. The no
agreement hypothesis suggests that their opponents should respond to this by ﬁeld-
ing ﬁrst themselves, in order to neutralize the West Indian fast bowling advantage.
However, this may have been perceived as a defensive tactic, especially if the oppo-
nents did not have a strong fast bowling attack. Thus teams may have overweighted
their own strengths, and underweighted the strengths of their opponents. While the
overweighting hypothesis appears to be the most plausible explanation for our re-
sults, we need to also consider more conventional explanations such as asymmetric
information.
Table 5: Win Probabilities, One Day Internationals†
Pr(Win) # matches p value
Win Toss & Bat, Day Matches 0.437 513 0.002
Win Toss & Field, Day Matches 0.503 768 0.57
Toss, Day Matches 0.476 1281 0.047
Win Toss & Bat, Day-Night Matches 0.555 366 0.02
Win Toss & Field, Day-Night Matches 0.493 148 0.47
Win Toss, Day-Night Matches 0.537 514 0.05
† Tied matches and no results excluded.
Let us now turn to the eﬀect of the chosen decision upon outcomes. Table 5
presents win probabilities as a function of the chosen decision. In day-night matches,
the team that bats ﬁrst on winning the toss has a signiﬁcant advantage, winning on
55.5% of occasions. On the other hand, the advantage of ﬁelding ﬁrst is not signif-
icantly diﬀerent from zero. In day matches, the team choosing to bat ﬁrst appears
to have a signiﬁcant disadvantage, winning on only 43.7% of the occasions, while
the winning frequency of a team choosing to ﬁeld ﬁrst is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 50%. Thus in day matches, teams appear to be choosing sub-optimally, by
batting ﬁrst at states where this confers a disadvantage. These results are reﬂected
in our estimates of the advantage of winning the toss — in day-night matches, the
team winning the toss wins on 53.7% of occasions, an advantage that is statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at 5% level, while in day matches the team that wins the toss wins
only 47.6% of the time, a statistically signiﬁcant disadvantage. We can therefore
reject the null that teams are making decisions optimally in day matches, since the
estimated treatment eﬀect from batting ﬁrst is negative.
14
4 Explanations
We now explore alternative explanations for our ﬁndings. These include asymmetric
information, the overweighting hypothesis and agency problems due to which the
captain of the team may not be concerned only with maximizing the win probability.
4.1 Asymmetric Information and No Agreement
One obvious explanation for violation of the no agreement theorem is asymmetric
information. Let us ﬁrst consider the possibility that a team may have less infor-
mation about the basic characteristics of opposing players. This is unlikely to be
an important factor, since most international teams have a relatively stable core
of well established players, whose characteristics are well known. Video footage of
international matches is also regularly studied by opponents. For example, in the
2003 world cup tournament, the median player of the nine major teams had made
over one hundred international appearances, with very few making less than 30 ap-
pearances. However, a team may not be aware of idiosyncratic factors which aﬀect
the other team, e.g. it is possible that an individual player may be not fully ﬁt on
the day of the match. (Each captain is required to announce the selected players
before the toss, so a team will be aware if its opponent leaves out a player, but it
is some chance that a player might be chosen to play without being 100% ﬁt). It
is easy to see idiosyncratic shocks can explain agreement between team decisions at
speciﬁc states. However, since idiosyncratic shocks can aﬀect either team and can
be in either direction, they cannot explain the empirical ﬁnding that some teams
bat ﬁrst signiﬁcantly less often than their opponents. To see this, we sketch a simple
model of idiosyncratic shocks as follows. Assume that after ω is chosen and λ(ω)
is observed by both teams, there is a small probability θ that one team (i) receives
a shock so that its advantage from batting ﬁrst is given by λ(ω) + ε, where ε has
distribution F. Assume that the distribution of shocks is symmetric across teams,
and for simplicity, assume that they aﬀect at most one team. Suppose that λ > 0 at
ω. Then teams may agree, so that team 1 chooses to bat ﬁrst while 2 chooses to ﬁeld
ﬁrst, and this event arises with probability θF (−λ). However, the event where team
1 chooses to ﬁeld and team 2 chooses to bat also arises with the same probability
θF (−λ), so that at any ω the probability of team 1 batting ﬁrst still equals to the
probability of team 2 batting ﬁrst.
To explain systematic biases, one needs to invoke the possibility that one team
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is systematically better informed than the other. This is possible, since the pitch
(the natural surface on which the game is played) plays an important role, and the
home team is likely to have better information about the nature of the pitch than
the visiting team. This is likely to be true for venues in the home country which are
not as well known or internationally established. The following anecdote from the
autobiography of Mike Atherton, former captain of England, is illustrative:
. . . at St. Vincent I made an error of judgement at the toss, putting
the West Indies in. We went down to a then record defeat for England in
one-day internationals. The day before that game I had been, literally,
sitting on the dock of the bay watching the time go by, and pondering
the team for the next day. A Rastafarian smoking a huge spliﬀ came by
and we got chatting. ‘Man,’ he said, ‘you always got to bat ﬁrst in St.
Vincent and then bowl second when the tide comes in.’ The pitch the
next day look mottled and uneven and I looked at it uncertainly. Geoﬀ
Boycott was also on the wicket and I asked his opinion. ‘I think you’ve
got to bowl ﬁrst,’ he said, ‘just to see how bad it is before you bat.’
In fact it was very good and the West Indies plundered 313, and then,
when the tide came in, it was very bad and we were skittled for 148. I
learned my lesson. When it comes to pitches you had never seen before,
local knowledge, rather than the Great Yorkshireman’s, was eminently
preferable. (Atherton, 2002, p.85).
We now set out a simple model of asymmetric information. Assume that, as
in Fig. 1, the set of states Ω is a compact interval, arranged so that the batting
advantage λ is a decreasing function of ω. Let ω be distributed with a density
f on the interval Ω. The information of player i, i ∈ {1, 2}, is represented by an
information partition Ωi of Ω. Thus if state ω is realized, and if ω belongs to the
k-th element of i’s information partition, Ωki , then player i is informed only of the
fact that ω ∈ Ωki . Suppose that team 1 is informed that ω ∈ Ωk1. The probability it
assigns to winning from batting ﬁrst is given by:
pk1 =
∫
Ωk1
p(ω)f(ω)dω. (5)
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While the probability assigned by team 1 to winning from ﬁelding ﬁrst is given by:
qk1 =
∫
Ωk1
q(ω)f(ω)dω. (6)
Thus it is optimal for team 1 to bat ﬁrst if pk1 > q
k
1 , and to ﬁeld ﬁrst other-
wise. Equivalently, it is optimal to bat ﬁrst if E(λ(ω) |Ωk1) > 0, and to ﬁeld ﬁrst
if E(λ(ω) |Ωk1) ≤ 0. Similarly, for team 2, it is optimal to bat ﬁrst at ω ∈ Ωk2 if
E(λ(ω) |Ωk2) > 0, and to ﬁeld ﬁrst if E(λ(ω) |Ωk2) ≤ 0.
Let Ω12 be the meet of the two information partitions, Ω1 and Ω2, i.e. the
coarsest partition that is ﬁner than both Ω1 and Ω2. Figure 2, on page 18, depicts
a simple example of the information partitions of the two players. The ﬁrst line
in this ﬁgure depicts the set of states, and the sets ΩB and ΩF . The second line
depicts player 1’s information partition, consisting of three sets, which are labelled
in terms of team 1’s optimal decision — team 1 will choose to bat at its ﬁrst two
information sets, and ﬁeld at the third. The third line depicts team 2’s information
partition, with the sets labelled in terms of team 2’s optimal decision. Finally, the
last line depicts Ω12, the meet of the two information partitions, with each element
being labelled in terms of the optimal decisions of team 1 and team 2 respectively.
We see that if ω ∈ Ω21 ∩ Ω22, i.e. the third set labelled BF, then team 1 will choose
to bat while team 2 chooses to ﬁeld, so that there is agreement on this subset of the
state space.
To investigate whether asymmetric information about pitches can explain no
agreement, we ﬁrst consider one day matches at neutral venues, where superior
information is unlikely to be a factor. Table 6 reports our results for day matches
involving Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the West Indies, where we had found violations
of no agreement. We ﬁnd that no agreement is rejected for neutral venues for two of
the three teams (Pakistan and West Indies). Table 4 tests the no agreement result
for all teams, utilizing only neutral venues, and ﬁnds that this is decisively rejected.
Table 6: Day Matches, Neutral Venues
Pr(Bat |win T) Pr(Field |Lose T) #matches Pearson p value
Pakistan 0.54 0.33 177 7.90∗∗∗ 0.005
Sri Lanka 0.31 0.41 112 1.22 0.27
West Indies 0.21 0.46 121 8.12∗∗∗ 0.004
For matches played at non-neutral venues, where one team may be better in-
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formed, asymmetric information can obviously be invoked as a catch-all explanation.
Let us however impose further structure, to see the likely pattern of biases when the
home team is better informed than the away team. Assume that the home team,
team 1, observes ω. Assume that with some probability π the away team (team 2)
also observes ω, while with probability 1 − π team 2 has no information. When
team 2 has no information, its optimal choice is given by determined by the average
value of λ, i.e. by:
E(λ) = Pr(ΩB)E(λ(ω) |ΩB) + Pr(ΩF )E(λ(ω) |ΩF ) (7)
Let us suppose, for the moment, that E(λ(ω) |ΩB) ≈ −E(λ(ω) |ΩF ), i.e. the
average advantage from batting ﬁrst when batting is optimal approximately equals
the average advantage from ﬁelding ﬁrst when ﬁelding is optimal. In this case, when
uninformed, team 2 will choose to match the expected decision of team 1. Thus team
2 will always bat ﬁrst if team 1 bats ﬁrst more often, and will always ﬁeld ﬁrst if
team 1 ﬁelds ﬁrst more often. So if the informed team bats ﬁrst more often, i.e.
Pr(ΩF ) > Pr(ΩB), the probability that team 2 bats ﬁrst is given by π Pr(ΩB).
Thus if the informed team is more likely to ﬁeld ﬁrst, the uninformed team ﬁelds
ﬁrst even more often. The informed team beneﬁts from its superior information at
states where it is optimal to bat ﬁrst. This conclusion ﬁts very well the incident
related by Atherton, where England made the “wrong” choice by deciding to ﬁeld
ﬁrst against a team (West Indies) which chooses to ﬁeld ﬁrst in most situations.
We now explore whether the diﬀerences in decisions across home and away venues
is consistent with the biases implied by the above model of asymmetric information.
In table 7 (page 20) we consider the three teams where no agreement fails (Pakistan,
Sri Lanka and West Indies), and see how their decisions diﬀer from their opponents
on home and away venues.
The table reports the batting frequencies of the home team and away teams, and
the third column reports whether the bias is in the right direction (i.e. consistent
with the home team being better informed) or not. The two teams for whom
no-agreement is violated at home venues are Sri Lanka and West Indies. Sri Lanka
chose to bat ﬁrst only 8% of the time when playing at home. If Sri Lanka had better
information, we would expect their opponents to respond to this by choosing to bat
ﬁrst even more infrequently. Instead we ﬁnd that they bat ﬁrst substantially more
often than Sri Lanka, with a discrepancy on 29% of the occasions. The magnitudes
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Table 7: Pr(Bat |Win Toss), Day Matches
Home Team Away Team Bias #matches Pearson† p value
Pak. Home 0.54 0.33 WRONG 102 0.25 0.62
Pak. Away 0.36 0.43 WRONG 125 0.59 0.44
SL home 0.09 0.40 WRONG 62 7.92∗∗∗ 0.005
SL away 0.31 0.26 RIGHT 94 NA‡ NA
WI home 0.28 0.50 WRONG 105 5.40∗∗ 0.02
WI away 0.36 0.35 RIGHT 125 NA NA
† Pearson test statistic computed when bias has wrong sign, for the null with bias=0.
‡ NA: Not Applicable.
involved also imply that the approximation E(λ(ω)|ΩB) ≈ −E(λ(ω)|ΩF ) used for
this argument is quite loose, since it suﬃces that E(λ|ΩB) < −11E(λ|ΩF ) for our
conclusions to hold. A similar argument applies to the West Indies — although
they bat ﬁrst only 28% of the time at home, their opponents respond by batting
ﬁrst substantially more often, at 50%. This reinforces our general conclusion, that
asymmetric information can explain speciﬁc departures from no-agreement (such
as that referred to by Atherton), but not the systematic departures we ﬁnd in the
data.8
4.2 Asymmetric Information and Treatment Eﬀects
Asymmetric information may also bias the estimates of treatment eﬀects, as reported
in table 5. Let ΩBi be the set of states where i ﬁnds it optimal to bat, and Ω
F
i be
the complement. We have seen that ΩB1 can diﬀer from Ω
B
2 under asymmetric
information. This can bias the estimates of the treatment eﬀect, if the ability of a
team is correlated with its propensity to bat ﬁrst. For example, the West Indies have
a lower probability of choosing to bat ﬁrst, and have also been one of the strongest
teams. This would tend to bias down the estimates of the probability of winning,
conditional upon choosing to bat ﬁrst. To see this, let z index the relative abilities
8As Meg Meyer has pointed out, one may invoke speciﬁc forms of asymmetric information in
order to generate biases in decisions of the uninformed away team which are more consistent with
the data. Let Pr(ΩB) < 0.5, and suppose that the away team’s information partition consists of
two elements, {Ω12,Ω22} with Ω22 a strict subset of ΩF . If Pr(ΩB) > 0.5Pr(Ω12), the away team will
choose to bat at Ω12 and will therefore bat more often than the home team (assuming E(λ|ΩB) ≈
−E(λ|ΩF ∩Ω12)). However, the diﬀerence in their batting probabilities must be less than Pr(ΩB).
This special information structure may conceivably explain the batting frequency of away teams
in the West Indies (0.50 as compared to 0.28) but not in Sri Lanka (0.40 compared to 0.09).
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of the two teams, and let:
p(ω, z) =
1
2
+
λ(ω)
2
+ z (8)
q(ω, z) =
1
2
− λ(ω)
2
+ z. (9)
Let α =
Pr(ΩB1 )
Pr(ΩB1 )+Pr(Ω
B
2 )
, the proportion of the time that the team choosing to bat
ﬁrst is team 1. The probability of winning, conditional on a team choosing to bat
and conditional on z, is given by:
Pr[Win |WT &Bat) = 0.5+(2α−1)z+0.5 [αE(λ(ω) |ΩB1 ) + (1− α)E(λ(ω) |ΩB2 )] .
(10)
Now since E(λ(ω) |Ωki ) ≥ 0 at every information set where team i chooses to bat
ﬁrst, the term in square brackets is positive. This term can still be interpreted as
the average treatment eﬀect when the treatment is optimal, with the caveat that the
two teams do not always agree at all states that the treatment is optimal. However,
if α = 0.5, the probability of winning also depends upon relative ability. This implies
that the winning probabilities in table 5 are not unbiased estimates of treatment
eﬀects, since ability may be correlated with the propensity to bat ﬁrst. Similarly,
the eﬀect of choosing of ﬁeld ﬁrst is given by
Pr[Win |WT & Field) = 0.5+(2β−1)z−0.5 [βE(λ(ω) |ΩF1 ) + (1− β)E(λ(ω) |ΩF2 )] ,
(11)
where β =
Pr(ΩF1 )
Pr(ΩF1 ) + Pr(Ω
F
2 )
. Here the term in square brackets is negative, which
implies that the once one controls for ability, the eﬀect of ﬁelding ﬁrst when choosing
to do so must be positive. It can be veriﬁed that the ability eﬀect has the opposite
sign as compared to (10).
Note however that asymmetric information does not bias the estimates of the toss
advantage, since this is exogenous. The advantage of winning the toss is weighted
average of the two probabilities:
Pr[Win |WT) = 0.5
{
1 +
Pr(ΩB1 )E(λ(ω) |ΩB1 ) + Pr(ΩB2 )E(λ(ω) |ΩB2 )
−Pr(ΩF1 )E(λ(ω) |ΩF1 )− Pr(ΩF2 )E(λ(ω) |ΩF2 )
}
. (12)
Note that the term in z cancels out, so that ability will not bias our estimates.
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However, it may still be useful to control for ability in order to improve the eﬃciency
of our estimates of the advantage of winning the toss.
We must therefore control for ability in order to provide unbiased estimates of
the treatment eﬀect. Let i and j index the two teams, and let us describe outcomes
from the point of view of team i. The probability that i wins given that i wins the
toss and chooses to bat is given by:
Pr(i win |WT & Bat) = 0.5 + zij + 0.5E(λ(ω) |ΩBi ). (13)
The probability that i wins given that i loses the toss and ﬁelds, is given by:
Pr(i win |LT & Field) = 0.5 + zij − 0.5E(λ(ω) |ΩBj ). (14)
Similarly, we have:
Pr(i win |WT & Field) = 0.5 + zij − 0.5E(λ(ω) |ΩFi ) (15)
Pr(i win |LT & Bat) = 0.5 + zij + 0.5E(λ(ω) |ΩFj ). (16)
Thus we may regress the outcome for this pair of teams (of ﬁxed relative ability
zij) on four dummy variables, WT&Bat, LT&Field, WT&Field, LT&Bat, (WT&Bat
equals one if and only if team i wins the toss and bats, and the other variables are
deﬁned analogously, and we exclude the constant term). The diﬀerence between the
coeﬃcients on WT&Bat and LT&Field is an unbiased estimate of 0.5[E(λ(ω) |ΩBi )+
E(λ(ω) |ΩBj )], i.e. of the average advantage from batting ﬁrst when batting is opti-
mal. Since there are only a few matches where relative ability may be assumed to
be constant, it is preferable to do this estimation on the entire data set. Speciﬁcally,
we estimate a linear probability model, with dummies for each pair of teams, (i, j).
We also distinguish between home and away matches — the control for venue of
play is a categorical variable which takes value 1 if the game is played at home (i.e.
in the country of team i), value −1 if the game is played away (i.e. in the country
of team j) and zero if played at a neutral venue. Finally, we introduce a dummy
variable corresponding to each of the four situations (WT&Bat, etc.) listed above.
Thus the treatment eﬀect of batting ﬁrst when batting is optimal (the coeﬃcient on
Toss & Bat in table 8) is given by the diﬀerence in coeﬃcients between the dummy
for winning the toss and batting that for losing the toss and ﬁelding.9 Similarly,
9From the theoretical model, this should equal a weighted average of E(λ(ω) |ΩBj ) across all
22
the eﬀect of ﬁelding ﬁrst when ﬁelding is optimal is given by the diﬀerence in coeﬃ-
cients between the dummy for winning the toss and ﬁelding that for losing the toss
and batting. The estimates reported in table 8 are very similar to the raw ﬁgures
in table 5. For example, the disadvantage when choosing to bat ﬁrst in day-night
matches is 0.126 from table 5 (this is computed as twice the probability of winning
minus 1) , while the estimate with ability controls is 0.123. Similarly, the advantage
when choosing to bat ﬁrst in day matches is 0.120 from table 5, while with ability
controls this advantage is 0.111. Thus our basic conclusions, that teams had a sig-
niﬁcant advantage from choosing to bat ﬁrst in day-night matches, and a signiﬁcant
disadvantage from choosing to bat ﬁrst in day matches, is unaltered by allowing
for controls for ability. Indeed, we have used a number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations to
control for ability (including allowing team abilities to be diﬀerent across periods),
and the results are not altered.
Table 8: Treatment Eﬀects by Type of One Day Match†
Day Day excl. G3‡ Day Day-Night Day-Night
Win Toss & Bat −0.123 (3.0) −0.194 (3.1) 0.111 (2.2)
Win Toss & Field 0.002 (0.1) 0.067 (1.1) −0.021 (0.7)
Win Toss −0.024 (1.8) −0.035 (1.6)
sample size 1292 445 1292 522 522
† Excluding matches without a result.
‡ Day matches not involving Pakistan, Sri Lanka or West Indies.
Table 8 conﬁrms that there is a signiﬁcant advantage to the team winning the
toss when it chooses to bat ﬁrst, a phenomenon which has recently been noted by
cricket commentators. In the recent world cup held in South Africa, commentators
remarked that the team batting second found it signiﬁcantly more diﬃcult to bat,
especially when dew increased the moisture in the pitch. Many suggested that day-
night matches were an unfair contest, of the “win the toss win the game variety”.
Day-night games are however popular with spectators, and ﬁnancial considerations
dictate that they will continue. One solution would be to handicap the team batting
ﬁrst appropriately, say by allowing them somewhat fewer balls to make their runs
in. Since the advantage to the team batting ﬁrst is not uniform, but heterogenous,
teams j, where the weight for team j is the fraction of times that team j bats ﬁrst on winning the
toss as a proportion of the number of times that any team winning the toss bats ﬁrst.
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the handicap should be state dependent. One solution is to adapt the classical
solution to the cake-cutting problem, ala Steinhaus — e.g. the team losing the toss
chooses the level of the handicap (i.e. the number of balls less that the team batting
ﬁrst would get), while the team winning the toss chooses whether the bat ﬁrst or
to ﬁeld ﬁrst given this handicap. If preferences are heterogeneous, the divider has
a strategic advantage in the cake cutting problem (see, for example, van Damme,
1991). However, since the choice of whether to bat or ﬁeld is essentially a choice
over probability distributions, the preferences of the two teams are identical in this
case, and this is a fair protocol.
Overall, our results suggest that teams do not make decisions very well when
they win the toss. In day-night matches, where cricket commentators recognize
the advantage from batting ﬁrst, teams tend to bat ﬁrst (over 70% of the time)
and appear to derive a signiﬁcant advantage when they choose to bat. In one day
internationals which are played in the day, teams which choose to bat ﬁrst seem
to have a signiﬁcant disadvantage from this choice. This is a robust ﬁnding, which
survives many diﬀerent controls to proxy the relative abilities of teams.
4.3 Overweighting strength
We have argued that asymmetric information does not provide a convincing expla-
nation for the failure of no-agreement in day matches. Instead, it seems that teams
overweight their own strengths (or weaknesses), and underweight the strengths or
weaknesses of their opponents. This is reinforced by the ﬁnding that one team in
particular — the West Indies — chose to ﬁeld ﬁrst more often than their opponents
in all forms of international cricket since the 1970s (see Bhaskar (2004) for an analy-
sis of decisions in test matches). The West Indies were the undisputed champions of
the world for a large part of this period, until the mid 1990s. Their dominance was
based on a hostile fast bowling attack, which was unparalleled in cricketing history,
and capable of intimidating their opponents — unlike baseball, it is a legitimate
cricket tactic for a bowler to hit the body of the batsman with the ball. Indeed, the
West Indies would usually play with four fast bowlers, and without any spin bowler
at all. Thus the West Indies would often choose to ﬁeld ﬁrst, allowing their fast
bowlers to exploit the early moisture on the pitch. This suggests that it would be
optimal for their opponents to ﬁrst , in order to deny the West Indies this advantage.
Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that the opponents often batted ﬁrst, since they did not have
a fast bowling attack as capable as that of the West Indies. In other words, faced
24
with the aggressive tendency of the West Indies to ﬁeld ﬁrst, their opponents did
not respond defensively by ﬁelding ﬁrst, but instead chose to bat ﬁrst on many oc-
casions. This overweighting hypothesis has some commonalities the winner’s curse,
where agents overweight their own information.
Let us now consider the eﬀect of overweighting on treatment eﬀects. Assume
that there is no asymmetric information, but suppose that team 1 has a strong fast
bowling attack, and overweights this in decisions. Speciﬁcally, the threshold value of
λ at which it chooses to bat is not 0, but some positive number λ1. Thus Ω
B
1 is the set
of states with λ(ω) ≥ λ1. Similarly, if team 2 also overweights its strength and bats
more often, it may choose a threshold λ2 < 0. In this case, the expected diﬀerence
between the coeﬃcients onWT&Bat and LT&Field is still given by 0.5[E(λ(ω)|ΩB1 )+
E(λ(ω)|ΩB2 )],although ΩB1 and ΩB2 have a diﬀerent interpretation as compared to
the asymmetric information case. Now in this speciﬁc example, E(λ(ω)|ΩB1 ) >
E(λ(ω)|ΩB) > 0, since team 1 only bats at states which are most favorable for
batting ﬁrst. However, E(λ(ω)|ΩB2 ) could possibly be negative, since team 2 also
bats at some states with λ < 0. Thus the net eﬀect of overweighting upon the
estimated treatment eﬀect is ambiguous. Evidence of overweighting does not, in
itself, explain why the estimated eﬀect of batting ﬁrst could be negative, as we ﬁnd
in the case of one day matches played in the day.
To see whether overweighting explains anomalous treatment eﬀects, we now drop
those teams where no-agreement is violated. That is, in day matches, we exclude
games where any team from the Gang of Three plays. These results are reported in
table 8, column 2. The negative treatment eﬀect from choosing to bat is substantially
larger — almost −19% as compared with −12% in column 1 of this table. Removing
the teams with whom overweighting is important does not seem to eliminate the
estimated negative treatment eﬀect.
4.4 Agency Problems
A second aspect in which decision making is does not seem to be optimal is in
terms of the estimated treatment eﬀects. In summary, the estimated advantage
from batting ﬁrst is positive in one-day day-night matches. However, in one day
matches played in the day, the teams which choose to bat ﬁrst seem to be choosing
suboptimally. We now see why the historical background and the way in which the
decision maker (the team captain) is evaluated may result in his having somewhat
diﬀerent interests than simply maximizing the probability of winning, thus resulting
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in an agency problem.
Traditions play an important role in cricket, and test cricket was the only form of
the game at international level, till 1970. Test match pitches used to be left uncov-
ered when play was not in session, hastening their deterioration over the ﬁve days
of play. This meant a recognizable advantage to batting ﬁrst 10 and in test matches
before 1975, captains chose to bat on 87% of occasions. This had a signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect on their winning probability — Bhaskar (2004) ﬁnds that the team
choosing to bat ﬁrst wins 55% of the time in matches with a result. In more recent
times, the practice of covering pitches when play is not in session has reduced this
advantage signiﬁcantly. The technology of making pitches has also improved, in-
creasing their durability, and making batting last less diﬃcult. In one day matches,
the scope for deterioration is more limited. Finally, in one day matches (as opposed
to test matches), the team batting second has the advantage of knowing precisely
what score needs to be made to secure victory — the dynamic programming anal-
ysis of Clarke (1999) and Preston and Thomas (2000) ﬁnd this to be quantitatively
signiﬁcant.
We argue that cricket was faced with a new innovation — one day matches
played in the day — where the relative gain from ﬁelding ﬁrst was high compared
to test cricket. However, the data shows that captains have not learnt very well
to make decisions in this new environment.11 One explanation is as follows: the
captain’s decision is evaluated by cricket commentators (usually former cricketers),
and in the ﬁnal analysis, by the selectors of the team, who are usually also former
cricketers. These evaluators may have outdated information, with a consequent bias
against batting ﬁrst. This bias appears to exist — as the former England captain
Brearley writes, “it is irrationally felt to be more of a gamble to put the other side
in (to bat) . . . decisions to bat ﬁrst, even when they have predictably catastrophic
consequences, are rarely held against one” (Brearley, 1985, p. 116). Thus a variant
on the management adage “no one ever got ﬁred for buying IBM”, may well partially
explain the persistence of suboptimal decisions.12 Given the relatively short time
horizon over which captains are evaluated, captains who choose to bat when there
is a small advantage to ﬁelding ﬁrst may well survive longer than those who choose
optimally.
10The legendary W.G. Grace once said: “When you win the toss — bat. If you are in doubt,
think about it — then bat. If you have serious doubts, consult a colleague — then bat.”
11Nor does there appear to be a signiﬁcant improvement in performance in more recent matches,
as would be the case if there was learnng.
12This also appears to be related to Romer’s (2003) ﬁnding, that the safer option tends to be
chosen in American football.
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5 Conclusions
While tests of decision theory have examined the consistency of decisions of a single
decision maker with stable preferences, the innovation of our study has been the
examination of the consistency of decision makers whose interests are opposed. For
this purpose, we are able to exploit “randomized trials” which are inherent in the
rules of the game. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant violations of consistency and argue that
these violations are best explained by a tendency for teams to overweight their own
strengths, and underweight those of their opponents. Our randomized trials also
allow us to identify average treatment eﬀects, conditional on the treatment being
optimal. Here again we ﬁnd some evidence that choices are not made optimally.
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